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Abstract 
In an experiment with 40 participants, the effect of time pressure on the search for risk defusing 
operators was investigated as the central research question. A risk defusing operator (RDO) is an action 
intended by the decision maker to be performed in addition to an otherwise attractive alternative and 
expected to decrease the risk. Examples in daily life are insurances or vaccinations. Decision-makers in 
experiments with quasi-realistic risky scenarios instead of gambles often search actively for RDOs. In 
the presented experiment, participants had to search for information they considered to be essential for 
reaching a decision. As expected, under time pressure search for information on RDOs and negative 
consequences increased, whereas search for positive consequences and probability decreased. Further-
more, the initially risky alternative was chosen more often under time pressure. As in other experiments 
on time pressure, the total amount of inspected information decreased.  
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Most people have probably experienced time pressure when making a decision. One con-
sequence of time pressure, for example, is that we often cannot take all the information we 
would like to into account. Our experiment investigates decision behavior in risky decision 
situations under time pressure. We study risky scenarios that are not pre-structured like 
gambles by the experimenter. In such scenarios, decision-makers often do not only passively 
assess the involved risk, but, they also actively search for additional factors that eliminate or 
reduce the risk associated with an otherwise attractive alternative. We investigate whether 
under time pressure people continue to search for risk-defusing operators or if they fall back 
onto risk avoiding heuristics.  
In experiments on (single-stage) risky decision-making, gambles are usually used as al-
ternatives or the alternatives are pre-structured like gambles by the experimenter. In such 
experiments, two variables are central for the decision: (a) the subjective values (utilities) of 
the consequences, and (b) the subjective probabilities of obtaining the consequences. The 
most prominent current theory founded on these variables is the Prospect theory (Kahneman 
& Tversky, 1979; Tversky & Kahneman, 1992). A recent analysis of such models is pre-
sented by Fox and See (2003) and Wu, Zhang and Gonzales (2004).  
In the last decade, however, a number of experiments have been published that question 
the generalizability of the value × probability approach to all decision situations: Huber, 
Wider & Huber 1997; Huber, Beutter, Montoya & Huber, 2001; Huber & Huber, 2003; 
Huber & Macho, 2001; Ranyard, Williamson & Cuthbert, 1999; Ranyard, Hinkley & Wil-
liamson, 2001; Schulte-Mecklenbeck & Huber, 2003; Tyszka & Zaleskiewicz, 2006; Wil-
liamson, Ranyard & Cuthbert, 2000a,b.  
These experiments work with quasi-realistic scenarios that are not pre-structured as gam-
bles by an experimenter. One example is the situation of a businesswoman who is confronted 
with two options: She can travel to a country where an epidemic disease rages in order to 
negotiate an important contract or she can postpone the meeting with the risk of not reaching 
a satisfying agreement (Bär & Huber, in press).  
Decision behavior in quasi-realistic scenarios differs in two main respects from that in 
gambling tasks: (a) in a great variety of tasks, most decision-makers are not interested in 
probability information as much as one would expect and (b) often, risk-defusing behavior is 
a central component of the decision process. If decision-makers realize that an otherwise 
attractive alternative may produce a negative outcome, they search for a risk-defusing opera-
tor. Shiloh, Gerad and Goldman (2006) replicated these main results in a study with real 
decisions in the context of genetic counseling. 
A risk-defusing operator (RDO) is an action intended by the decision-maker to be per-
formed in addition to a specific existing alternative and expected to decrease the risk. Con-
sider the situation in the example above: our businesswoman may not only reflect on the 
probability of becoming infected, but may inquire whether a vaccination exists or look for 
possibilities to prevent an infection (e.g., by cooking water before drinking it). All these 
additional actions are RDOs. RDOs are quite common in everyday risky decision situations. 
Typical examples are: Buying auto theft insurance, wearing protective gear to avoid contact 
with a toxic substance, or copying important documents. If an RDO is detected with a prom-
ising alternative, it is usually chosen (Bär & Huber, in press).  Time pressure in risky decision-making: Effect on risk defusing  417 
It should be noted that incorporating an RDO is not the same as looking for a new alter-
native.
2 The concept of RDOs is closely related to the concept of control: An RDO provides 
the decision-maker with at least some control over the risk and as we know from research on 
risk perception, controllable risks are experienced as less grave than uncontrollable ones 
(e.g., Lion, 2001; Weinstein, 1984; Vlek and Stallen, 1981).  
Huber (2007) summarizes the results of experiments which investigated factors influenc-
ing the search for RDOs (e.g., attractiveness of the alternative, expectation of finding rele-
vant information) and the factors affecting the acceptance of an RDO (e.g., cost, effect). 
Different types of RDOs are distinguished in Huber (2007), Huber and Huber (2003) and 
Huber & Wicki (2004). There is a great variability between scenarios in the search for RDOs 
as well as for probabilities. Huber and Huber (in press) identify background knowledge and 
local expectations to get useful information as two factors determining the search.  
Decisions in everyday life are often made under time limits. For example, a person who 
is offered a job position has three days from the time of the offer as a deadline to decide 
whether to accept the offer or not. Time pressure exists when there is a deadline and the 
decision maker realizes that the available time may be too short to make a decision (Ariely & 
Zakay, 2001; Benson, Groth & Beach, 1998; Maule & Hockey, 1993; Svenson & Benson, 
1993). Instead of an explicit deadline, the decision situation may induce a pressure to make a 
quick decision. An example is the search for a house where an attractive offer may be taken 
away by another buyer if one waits too long. The effect of time pressure on choices has been 
investigated in a variety of studies, for example, Betsch, Fiedler and Brinkmann (1998), 
Diederich (2003), Dror, Busemeyer and Basola (1999) or Payne, Bettman and Luce (1996). 
The presented study is especially interested in the effect of time pressure on risk defusing 
behavior as one component of the decision process. Few studies exist, which concern the 
process of decision-making and information search behavior. An overview is presented by 
Maule and Edland (1997). Maule and Hockey (1993) distinguish two main strategies used by 
decision-makers to cope with time pressure: micro-strategy changes (acceleration and selec-
tivity) and macro-strategy changes (change of the decision strategy). Payne, Bettman & 
Johnson (1993) and Payne, Bettman and Luce (1996) combine these two general strategies in 
the context of their effort-accuracy framework.  
Acceleration means that the decision-maker increases the speed of information process-
ing and in this way needs less time to execute a specific information process. This behavior 
was observed, for example, in Ben Zur and Breznitz (1981) or in Maule et al. (2000). Selec-
tivity means that the decision-maker processes less information under time pressure. The 
selection of information may not only concern the total amount of used information but also 
the type of information chosen. The decision maker may, for example, specifically select 
negative information (Wright, 1974) or concentrate on information that is more important 
and ignore the less relevant information (Edland, 1993). Selectivity may also result as a 
consequence of the change of heuristics, for example, from a compensatory heuristic to the 
Lexicographic one (Payne, Bettman & Luce, 1996; Rieskamp & Hoffrage, 1999).  
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Whereas time pressure has been investigated in different types of risky decisions (see 
above), in the context of RDOs, time limits have not yet been studied. In our experiment, we 
are investigating the problem of how time pressure affects risk defusing behavior in the 
decision process.  
We are especially interested in the question of whether or not decision-makers under 
time pressure search for RDOs or switch to choosing the safe alternative. If RDOs are as 
central to the decision process as they appear to be in many previous experiments, the search 
for RDOs should even increase under time pressure. There are two possible reasons for an 
increase: Under time pressure, the decision-maker becomes aware that he or she cannot 
inspect and process all of the information that would usually be taken into account. There-
fore, a part of the information must be selected. In such a situation decision-makers are ex-
pected to aim at not overlooking potential dangers. As a result, the perceived dangers and 
risks become more salient and therefore the pressure to defuse the risk increases. As a conse-
quence, the threshold for an RDO search (Ranyard et al., 2001) is more likely surpassed. 
Time pressure may furthermore induce a more negative emotional state (Maule, Hockey & 
Bdzola, 2000). A negative emotional state results in more controlled and less automatic 
cognitive processes (e.g., Dunegan, 1993). A more controlled process should draw the deci-
sion-maker’s attention to the construction of the mental representation of the alternatives and 
lead to a higher likelihood of changing the initial cognitive representation, for example, by 
introducing an RDO as an action defusing risk. As a further consequence of the higher sali-
ence of potential dangers we expect an increase in the search for information about negative 
outcomes. We assume that this type of information becomes more important to the decision-
maker if she knows that she can probably not process all the information she would like to. 
This prediction is also consistent with the expected effects of a negative emotional state.  
 
 
Method 
 
Participants 
 
40 students and non-students of different professions (22 f, 18 m; mean age 28.5 years) 
took part as voluntary participants. None of them had partaken in a similar experiment be-
fore. 
 
 
Decision scenarios 
 
We used two quasi-realistic risky decision scenarios from Bär and Huber (in press): Vi-
rus infection and Breeding turtles. A third scenario – Post office (Huber, Wider & Huber, 
1997) – served as a warm-up. The Breeding turtles scenario is described in more detail be-
low. In the Virus infection scenario, the participant takes on the role of a vacationer on a 
tropical island, who is infected with a dangerous virus and has to decide on his or her treat-
ment. In the Post office scenario, the participant acts as the manager who has to decide 
whether or not to rent additional space.  
In all scenarios, two alternatives were presented: a non-risky alternative with certain 
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that initially no alternative dominated and that the detection of an RDO could be expected to 
result in a choice of the (initially) risky alternative. We selected scenarios from our former 
experiments in which usually only a minority of decision-makers searched for an RDO be-
cause we also wanted to leave room for an increase in the RDO search. 
 
 
The Breeding turtles scenario 
 
The participant takes on the role of the head of an international program to protect an en-
dangered species of ocean turtles. The last of the remaining turtles are kept in a nature re-
serve. Unfortunately, the turtles do not breed in the reserve. Now, biologists have found two 
possible breeding places.  
Alternative A: Beach (non-risky alternative). A beach situated close to the reserve would 
be suitable for breeding. On this beach, the turtles are not at risk because there aren't any 
predators. However, the water is only of moderate quality. Therefore, the reproduction rate 
of the turtles is low. 
Alternative B: Island (risky alternative). A little island provides a perfect environment 
for breeding. It is also free of predators. Unfortunately, an epidemic of salt water mites can 
occasionally occur. If the epidemic occurs, the mites attack the turtles’ eggs thereby killing 
the offspring.  
Note that this description is not the instructions which were presented to the participants. 
The instructions for the two main scenarios are provided in the appendix. 
 
 
Method of Active Information Search 
 
In order to test our hypotheses we have to determine which information decision-makers 
are actively searching for (e.g. information about the existence of an RDO or about the prob-
ability of a negative outcome,). With the Method of Active Information Search (Huber et al., 
1997), the participant is given a short description of the decision situation first. Then, he or 
she can ask questions in order to obtain more information from the experimenter. The ques-
tion is recorded, and the answer is given from a list of standardized answers. Elaborate pre-
experiments are necessary in order to optimize the short description and to standardize the 
answers. Note that the participant asks the questions, not the experimenter. 
Different variations of the basic version of the AIS-method have been developed. An 
overview is presented in Huber, Schulte-Mecklenbeck and Huber (2006), where detailed 
instructions for the application of the method are given.  
In our experiment, we use the list-version of AIS: Here, the decision-maker is presented 
with a list of questions and may select as many as wanted and as often as wanted but only 
one question at a time. Table 1 contains the questions on the list. These questions cover all 
categories of questions that are usually put forward by decision-makers (Huber et al., 2001; 
Schulte-Mecklenbeck & Huber, 2003). In each scenario, the terms “alternative A” and “al-
ternative B” were replaced by the names of the respective alternative (e.g., “beach” and 
“island”). The sequence of questions was the same in all scenarios, in order to avoid time 
loss by searching for a specific question. O. Huber & U. Kunz  420 
Table 1:  
List of questions 
 
Question  Type of information 
requested 
Can I learn more about the situation?  general situation 
What are the positive consequences of alternative A?
b)  positive outcomes  
What are the negative consequences of alternative A?
 b)  negative outcomes  
What is the probability that the negative consequences will 
occur with alternative A?
 b) 
probability 
Can I do something to prevent the negative consequences 
of alternative A?
 b) 
RDO 
Are there other options besides A and B?
c) new  alternative 
b  The same question was included for alternative B 
c  The answer to this question was always “no” 
 
 
We chose the list version because otherwise the participant would need too much time to 
come up with a question and formulate it and therefore time pressure could not be controlled. 
The list version provokes a higher number of all types of questions (Huber et al., 2001). For 
our research question, this increase is no disadvantage because we are interested is a com-
parison of the frequencies of specific types of questions (e.g., RDO) in different experimen-
tal conditions and not in the absolute frequencies (cf. also Huber et al., 2006). 
 
Design and procedure 
 
There were two main independent variables that were varied within participants: Time 
pressure and Scenarios. The independent variable Scenarios had two levels: Virus infection 
and Breeding turtles. The independent variable Time pressure also had two levels: with and 
without time pressure.  
Participants were run individually. They started with the Post office scenario as a warm-
up task. Then the Virus infection and the Breeding turtles scenarios were administered. The 
sequence of the two scenarios and the time pressure conditions were counterbalanced.  
Time pressure was operationalized according to Benson and Beach (1996). In a pre-
experiment, the mean time participants needed to make their decisions in the two scenarios 
was determined. In the time pressure conditions of the experiment, participants had to make 
their decision within a time limit that was one standard deviation below the mean of the pre-
experiment: 195 sec in the Breeding turtles scenario, 180 sec in the Virus scenario. In the 
condition with time pressure, a clock counting backwards was placed in the participant’s 
field of vision, so that he or she always knew how much time was left. 
 
Results 
 
The following question types were analyzed as dependent variables: total number of all 
types of questions, questions for negative consequences, positive consequences, RDOs and 
probability. Table 2 summarizes the mean values.  Time pressure in risky decision-making: Effect on risk defusing  421 
Table 2:  
Mean number of questions, percentage of participants with at least one question and choices  
as a function of time pressure condition and scenario 
 
  No Time pressure    Time  pressure 
 
Dependent  variable 
Turtles
(N=20) 
Virus
(N=20) 
Total
(N=40) 
  Turtles
(N=20) 
Virus 
(N=20) 
Total    
(N=40) 
Mean number of questions 
all types  4.10  5.00  4.55   3.45  3.10  3.28 
negative consequences  0.85  0.85  0.85   1.60  1.30  1.45 
positive consequences  1.45  1.70  1.58   0.45  0.45  0.45 
RDO 0.25  0.45  0.35   1.15  0.75  0.95 
probability 0.55  0.85  0.70   0.20  0.40  0.30 
Percentage of participants with at least one question  
negative consequences  55%  55%  55%   85%  70% 77.5% 
positive consequences  80%  90%  85%   35%  40% 37.5% 
RDO 25%  45%  35%   65%  60% 62.5% 
probability 50%  65%  57.5%   30%  25% 27.5% 
Number of participants and percentage who chose the initially risky alternative 
 9   
(45%) 
8  
(40%) 
17  
(43%) 
 15   
(75%) 
13  
(65%) 
28  
(70%) 
 
 
The mean total number of questions is lower under time pressure. A repeated measures 
ANOVA (repeated factor: time pressure, other factors: sequence of scenarios and time-
pressure in which scenario) confirms this impression, with time pressure as the sole signifi-
cant factor: F(1,36)=24.72, p<.001, effect size f=.83 (large effect according to Cohen, 1977). 
Search questions for negative consequences, positive consequences, RDOs and probabil-
ity have only very few observed values and are not normally distributed. Therefore, the 
Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed rank-test was used as test statistic. 
The search for information on negative consequences and on RDOs increased under time 
pressure. For the negative consequences, z=2.86 (N=40), p<.05. For the RDO questions, 
z=2.92 (N=40), p<.01. Therefore, we conclude that the increase is significant. Effect size r 
was computed by transforming the z-value into a correlation coefficient r (Rosenthal, 1991). 
r = .45 for negative consequences and .46 for RDOs, both values indicating a medium effect. 
Search for information on positive consequences and on probabilities decreased under 
time pressure. The Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed rank-test was significant in both vari-
ables. For the positive consequences, z=4.65 (N=40), p<.001, effect size r = .74; and for the 
probability questions, z=3.58 (N=40), p<.001, r = 57. In both variables, effect size indicates 
a large effect. 
As in other experiments, the means of the number of questions might be biased because 
some participants ask the same category of questions several times, whereas others do not 
ask at all. Therefore, we additionally analyzed the percentage of participants who asked the 
respective question category at least once as a dependent variable. These data are also in-
cluded in Table 2. The results confirm those with mean numbers as dependent variables. The 
search for negative consequences and for RDOs increased under time pressure; McNemar O. Huber & U. Kunz  422 
test: χ
2(1) = 5.4, N=40, p<.01, w=0.38, medium effect, and χ
2(1) = 7.35, N=40, p<.01, 
w=0.43, medium effect. The search for information on positive consequences and on prob-
abilities decreased under time pressure; McNemar test: χ
2(1) = 19.0, N=40, p<.001, w=0.69, 
large effect, and χ
2(1) = 9.94, N=40, p<.001, w=0.50, large effect. 
The first question concerning outcomes was about the positive outcome in 83% of cases 
without time pressure and in 22% of cases with time pressure. In both scenarios, the differ-
ence is significant; Turtles: χ
2 (1)=14.29, p<.00001, effect size w=.65, large effect; Virus: χ
2 
(1)=7.16, p<.01, effect size w=.46, medium effect. 
Additionally, we analyzed the proportion of people who chose the initially risky alterna-
tive; these data are also included in Table 2. Under time pressure, the initially risky alterna-
tive was chosen more often (McNemar test: χ
2(1) = 6.37, N=40, p<.01, w=0.40, medium 
effect). 
 
 
Discussion 
 
Under time pressure, less information was searched for in general. This result is consis-
tent with the usual result in research on time pressure and confirms the hypothesis of selec-
tivity. Most questions that were asked concerned positive or negative consequences in both 
conditions. This result is common in experiments with quasi-realistic scenarios and reflects 
the fact that consequences are the basic information necessary to construct a mental repre-
sentation of the alternatives. Usually an RDO – as an elaboration of a representation – is 
only searched for when the decision maker knows that a negative consequence may occur.  
The relation between the search for positive and negative consequences changes as a 
consequence of time pressure: Whereas without time pressure more positive consequences 
are explored, under time pressure decision-makers search distinctly more for negative conse-
quences. The switch from a search for positive information to a negative one is in accor-
dance with Ben-Zur and Breznitz (1981) and Wright (1974), but seems to contradict the 
results of Maule et al. (2000). The latter experiment is especially relevant for us because 
these authors also used risky scenarios. The difference may be attributed to their different 
operationalization: they used the relative proportion of time spent with the negative informa-
tion as dependent variable. This time decreased under time pressure. One explanation for this 
shorter time is that the decision-maker used simpler and, therefore, faster mental operations 
to process negative information. For example, they could use a coarser subjective scale for 
the evaluation or place thresholds in such a way that faster processing was possible. In this 
respect, further research is necessary. The results concerning the search for positive and 
negative consequences are also relevant for the Priority heuristic (Brandstätter, Gigerenzer & 
Hertwig, 2006) which predicts that negative consequences are searched for first. Our results 
confirm this prediction only for the time pressure condition, but disconfirms it for the condi-
tion without time pressure. 
The most important results of our experiment concern the search for RDOs and probabil-
ity. While many subjects posed probability questions without time pressure (especially in the 
Virus scenario) only a minority did in the time pressure condition. In contrast, under time 
pressure more decision-makers invested their limited time in a search for RDOs. Under time 
pressure, 73% of all questions concerned negative outcomes or RDOs, in comparison to only 
27% without time pressure. Time pressure in risky decision-making: Effect on risk defusing  423 
Our results do not further support the conclusion that risk taking is increased under time 
pressure, this result being in accordance to Maule et al. (2000). Even if more of our partici-
pants choose the initially risky alternative under time pressure, one has to take into account 
that also a higher number searched for RDOs. Finding an RDO transforms an initially risky 
alternative into a non-risky one.  
The most relevant finding for risk defusing is that the search for RDOs even increased in 
a condition with limited time. Additional research should investigate whether the saliency of 
the risk dimensions or the effect of the induced negative emotional state is more relevant 
under time pressure. 
Together with the decrease of interest in probability information, the increase of RDO 
search under time pressure demonstrates the importance of risk defusing in non-gambling 
risky decision situations. Further research should investigate the preferences for different 
types of RDOs under time pressure, for example, the preferences for Pre-event RDOs and 
Post-event RDOs (Huber & Huber, 2003). 
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Appendix: Scenarios 
 
Below the instructions for the two main scenarios are provided (our translation). It 
should be noted that the participant learned about the different risks connected with the 
alternatives when they received the answers to questions concerning the negative outcomes. 
For the risky alternative, the answer contained the information that the negative consequence 
may occur. This formulation provided basic information about uncertainty, but no probabil-
ity was presented. The participant, however, knew from the available question list that he or 
she could get information about probability. 
 
 
The Breeding turtles scenario 
 
The ocean turtle named Parrot hawksbill turtle is well-known because of its richly-
colored shell. It lives in the Southern Pacific but is in danger of extinction. The last of the 
remaining turtles are held in a nature reserve which belongs to the WWF on a small island. 
Here, they are safe but do not breed. They only breed in their natural habitat with the right 
water and beach conditions. 
You are the head of the program to save the Parrot hawksbill turtle and responsible for 
the survival of the species. Regretfully your means for the program are limited. 
Now, sea biologists have found two possible breeding places. You have to decide which 
place the turtles should be transported to. Because the animals do not breed when their group 
is too small, all animals have to be transported to the same breeding place.  
Alternative A: a beach situated close to the reserve.  
Alternative B: a small island.  
 
 
Virus infection scenario 
 
During a journey on a tropical island you have been infected with a life-threatening vi-
rus. You have a high fever and cannot be transported. The disease has to be treated immedi-
ately because otherwise death is imminent within one week. 
There are only two possibilities for treatment, from which you have to chose: 
Alternative A: the traditional medication of Relox, a tropical medicine. 
Alternative B: the newly developed medication Nexin.  
 
 
 